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Brokers' Right to Commissions.- Holmes v. Neafe et al., 24 Atlan-
tic Reporter io96 (Penna.) This was a suit brought by a broker
to recover commission for negotiating a contract, he having
brought an intending purchaser and a ship builder together,
thereby effecting a contract for the construction of a steam vessel.
It is unusual, in negotiations of this description, to employ a
broker; the terms of a contract are usually determined by the
parties themselves. But, in this case there was this additional
circumstance that, before the contract was awarded to the ship-
builder represented by the broker, he was required to make bids
and enter into competition with other builders. The court held
that the mere fact that the ship-builder was required to enter into
competition with other builders before the contrdct was awarded
to him does not deprive the broker of his right to commission.
Carriers of Goods -iability as Warehousemen -Failure to Deliver
-Fire -Proximate Cause.-East Tennessee, V. & G. R. R. Co. v.
Kelley, 20 S. W. Rep. 312 (Tenn.) Kelley purchased five barrels
of whisky in New York and had the same consigned to himself
at Chattanooga. Plaintiff in error was the last carrier over whose
line the goods passed. On the 24 th of April, x89i, the whisky
was unloaded and stored in defendant's depot at Chattanooga.
Twice each day, from the 25 th to the 28th of April, i89i, Kelley,
through his drayman, called at the depot demanding the whisky.
Each time the agent met him with the reply that it was not there.
On the morning of the 29th the depot was burned. The whisky
was destroyed in the fire. Three important points are passed
upon by the court in this case. The first is: Under the existing
state of facts was the railway company liable as a carrier or as a
warehouseman? Caldwell J. after referring to the fact that the
authorities were in irreconcilable conflict on this question, stated
the position of the Tennessee courts to be that the railway com-
pany was acting as a warehouseman in this instance and was
therefore liable only for negligence. The second point is: Was
the refusal, upon demand to deliver the goods, negligence on the
part of the railway company? The court held that it was a clear
case of negligence. But this negligence did not cause the fire
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and it was the fire that destroyed the goods. The third point is:
Was this negligence the proximate cause of the loss of the goods,
when it was shown that the cause of the fire was not on account
of negligence on the part of the railway company? In answer to
this question, the court says: "The neglect and wrongful deten-
tion of the goods and that alone exposed them to the fire, and but
for that detention, they would not have been destroyed though
the fire did occur. Thus it becomes obvious that the negligence
of the railway company was the proximate cause of the loss. The
casual connection between the failure to deliver the goods and the
injury to the plaintiff is complete."
Costs- Who Liable for.- -Foster v. Verner, 25 At. Rep. 174
(Pa.). On the dismissal of a bill in equity it was decreed that the
parties should jointly pay the master's fees. The plaintiff was
insolvent and hence defendant would be liable for the whole
amount. The court held that as the plaintiff failed to sustain his
bill it was unjust for defendant to pay all the costs, and the decree
should be so modified that each would pay an equal part; for
though in this case the master could not recover any portion from
the plaintiff, yet it would be unjust to remedy the difficulty by
throwing all the costs of the protracted litigation upon the defend-
ant.
Surface Water Drainage - Construction of Railroad. - Staton v.
NAorfolk k C. R. Co., 16 S. E. Rep. x8x (N. Carolina). The
defendant constructed a ditch along its right-of-way, such ditch
being necessary to the operation of the road, and carefully con-
structed. Through this channel, surface water, being diverted
from the direction in which it naturally flowed, was conducted
and finally emptied into a natural water course, whereby -the
plaintiff's land was overflowed. The railroad company was held
liable for the damage thus inflicted, the court following Jrenkins v.
Railroad Co., 15 S. E. Rep. 193, where it said that "a railroad
company enjoys the same privileges as any other land-owner, but
no greater, to be exeicised under the same restrictions and quali-
fications." To the proposition urged by the defendant that inas-
much as the legislature had authorized the. construction of the
road an adjacent proprietor could not recover for any damage
incident to such construction, provided the work was necessary
and properly done, the court replied that such a ruling would
make an exception to the maxim sic utere tuo, etc., in favor of rail-
roads. And although North Carolina is the only State in the
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-Union that does not expressly provide that "private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation,"
nevertheless the principles of justice derived from Magna Charta
and embodied in the common law of the State must prevail.
Moreover, had the immunity from liability, claimed by the rail-
road, been expressly granted by statute, such legislation would
have been in conflict with the constitutional rights of the people,
and therefore void. The point urged by the railroad company,
and decided against it, seems never before to have been passed
upon.
Elections-9estrucion of Ballots after Couning- Evidence.-
Commonwealth v. Ryan, 32 N. E. Rep. 349. This was an indict-
ment for altering a ballot in the State election of Massachusetts
in the fall of 1891. The statute of Massachusetts provides that
the "City and town clerks shall receive the envelopes contain-
ing the ballots thrown at any election, sealed as hereinbefore pro-
vided, and shall retain them in their care until the requirements
of the law have been complied with; and, as soon as may be
thereafter, said clerks shall cause such ballots to be destroyed
without examining them, or jermitting them to be examined." The court
held that such ballots can be retained for any length of time for
the purpose of defending or supporting a eriminal charge, and that
the phrases, "without examining them, or permitting them to be
examined" are not applicable in case such ballot is needed to
defend or support a criminal charge.
Mfethods of Calling Meetings Under a City Charter.-Russell v. Well-
ington et al., 3 N. E. Rep. 630 (Mass.).-The decision in this case
depended on the construction of a clause in the city charter, viz:
the Mayor "may call special meetings of the City councils * *
* by causing notice to be left at the usual place of residence of
each member of the board." Query: Was a meeting legally called
where a member was personally notified and not at his residence?
The court said: It was required that notice should be left at the
member's residence since personal notice might be impossible,
but in case of doubt that a written notice so left was good notice
whether it was received by the member or not. Personal notice
is really the most effectual way of serving, and if sent through the
post-office and received by the member on the street it would be
as valid as if delivered at his residence. The clause is not manda-
tory in any such sense as to exclude personal notification.
Knowlton J. dissents however, saying: In calling special meet-
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ings of a city council all provisions of the charter must be strictly
obeyed. (i Dill. Mun. Corp. § 263, Rex v. May, 5 Burrows, 2682,
and many others.) The meeting is "called" by the leaving of
the notice. "It is not as if the statute said the mayor may call a
meeting by determining that one shall be held and afterwards
shall give reasonable notice of the call by leaving a notification at
the residence of each member. Under the statute a meeting may
be ' called' by doing a certain thing, and there is no authority in
anybody to 'call' it otherwise." The mental act of the mayor in
determining that a meeting is necessary is not the "calling" of that
meeting. If it was, and the clause in the charter merely required
reasonable notice to the members of such intention, the "validity of
the most important transactions of cities will be left to the uncer-
tainty and doubt arising from oral testimony in regard to the
methods * * * which a mayor at any time chooses to
adopt in calling a special meeting."
Name-Middle Initial a Part of.-German National Bank v.
National State Bank, 3I Pacific Reporter 122 (Colorado).-In this
case it is directly decided that the middle initial is a part of a man's
name, it being held that a garnishee is unaffected by a notice
served on him in which the middle initial of the person named is
different from that of a person to whom he is indebted-he having
no knowledge that his debtor and the person named in the notice
are the same. The language of the court is as follows: "The
wide extension and rapid increase of population, the great and
unprecedented growth of commercial transactions have compelled
the use of different forms, and the adoption of different methods
to distinguish individuals. The middle name, or the middle letter,
is as much a part of a man's name in this part of the present
century as either his Christian or his surname."
Refusal to accept Railroad Ticket.- Chicago 6 B. I. R. Co. v.
Conley, 32 N. E. Rep. 96 (Ind.). A man bought a round-trip
ticket between Newport and Terre Haute, Indiana. On
reaching Terre Haute he accidentally wet the return ticket and
the color came out. On making the return trip some days later
he tendered this ticket which was the same as when he bought it
except for its color. The conductor refused to take it and
endeavored to put him out for not paying his fare, without allow-
ing him to make any explanations. He paid the fare under
protest and now recovers not only that but damages for the humil-
iation. Whenever it appeaxs that a man is endeavoring to ride
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on a train on an injured ticket the conductor is bound to bear his
explanation.
Roarian Rights. -New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. Aldridge,
32 N. E. Rep. 50 (N. Y.). The Hudson R. R. Co. received by
grant in its charter, the power to lay out a railroad on the east
bank of the Hudson river and the land selected for this purpose
was appraised and conveyed to the company. The question was,
whether a railroad company owning a right of way along a river-
bank was an owner of the "adjacent uplands" in such a sense as
to make it, by statute, a riparian proprietor. Other questions of
interpretation of charter arose and were considered in the same
opinion. The New York Court of Appeals sustained the decision
of the Supreme Court by holding that the railroad company was
not the riparian proprietor, but he through whose hands the right
of way had been granted. The reason was, that grants of land
under water had been made to those owning the adjacent uplands,
in order to increase the commerce of the State, as by building
docks, etc. The court said that this reason would fail in the case
of a railroad company authorized to do railroad business only,
because, so limited by charter, it could not increase the commerce
of the State in the way intended. Also "the limitation placed by
the statute upon the use of this strip of land by the railroad com-
pany, precludes the ordinary consequences from attaching to a
conveyance in fee of land."
